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Abstract—Viral campaigns are crucial methods for word-of-
mouth marketing in social communities. The goal of these 
campaigns is to encourage people for activity. The problem of 
incentivised and non-incentivised campaigns is studied in the 
paper. Based on the data collected within the real social 
networking site both approaches were compared. The 
experimental results revealed that a highly motivated 
campaign not necessarily provides better results due to 
overlapping effect. Additional studies have shown that the 
behaviour of individual community members in the campaign 
based on their service profile can be predicted but the 
classification accuracy may be limited. 
Keywords-social network analysis, incentivised campaigns 
effectiveness, viral campaigns, viral marketing 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The most important goal of every social network 
campaign is to maximize the spread of information across 
the network while keeping the campaign budget on  
a minimum level. Depending on the type of the campaign, 
whether it is an informative, activity or sales oriented one, 
methods to achieve this goal do differ. However, each time 
when a new social network viral campaign is planned, there 
is a need to consider whether it is required to support it by 
incentives of any kind. In the case where it should be 
stimulated, researchers provide a variety of theoretical 
models to maximize the effects of incentivised campaigns 
[1], [2], [3] or scenarios for social networks users rewarding 
[4], [5]. However, there is still a great need to compare the 
speed and effectiveness of incentivised viral campaigns on 
real datasets [6], especially by preserving the same social 
network environment to compare the obtained results for 
different strategies. To supply this field with new 
experimental results and new research ideas, this paper 
presents such a comparison by using real-life social network 
data, where two similar viral campaigns were started 
simultaneously, the first one with incentives supporting 
activity and the other one without them. Differences between 
those campaigns’ effects are presented, with a special focus 
on information diffusion speed, effectiveness, user role and 
his involvement in the campaign. As the results show, 
incentivised campaigns for activity are not necessarily better 
than those without incentives. The authors present the 
conclusions about the possible negative effects of 
incentivised campaigns. Besides pointing out negative 
aspects, the novelty of this paper is that authors analyse 
effects of incentivised campaign after it was finished, what 
they call inertia of the incentivised campaign. All of the dyad 
types involved in viral campaigns by senders’ and recipients’ 
role are defined as well, and those users were later classified 
to know what group they may fit into while starting a new 
campaign. 
The next section of this paper presents the problem of the 
effectiveness in viral, word-of-mouth campaigns in more 
detail by referencing to related work in the subject area. 
Section four presents the description of the social platform 
where the two campaigns took place. The main section of 
this paper, Section IV, presents results of the experiment and 
the last one, Section V, concludes and presents future work 
ideas. 
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND RELATED WORK 
Viral campaign management in the online environment 
includes several stages related to the content design [7], 
seeding strategies [8], predicting campaign states with 
mathematical models [9], monitoring [10] and psychological 
aspects [7]. 
In the field of psychology, it is known that external 
incentives are not necessarily the best when considering 
people motivation [11], [12]. Users often are motivated by 
themselves (intrinsic motivation), because they want to 
reciprocate to others [13] or would like to gain higher social 
approval [14]. In both cases any kind of economic incentives 
may not stimulate as much as the influencer would like to 
[11]. Another important factor of motivating people is to ask 
them to perform some activity interesting from their point of 
view, but their claims often are more optimistic than their 
behaviour in comparison to extrinsic incentives [15], [16]. 
That leads to the conclusion that incentives may be helpful 
for motivating users to perform some activity, however it is 
often a problem of how the optimal motivation should look 
like. 
To have better control over the results and campaign 
reach, marketers can influence campaign dynamics using 
  
techniques based on incentives like discounts, referral 
bonuses or revenue sharing approach [17], [18]. Incentives 
can affect campaign dynamics positively but also concerns 
about the evaluation of their effectiveness may be found 
[19]. For example, when having too many incentives, the 
range and number of engaged users may go beyond the 
budget and it may go out of control even after ending the 
main campaign. With incentives, it is questionable whether 
the campaign will be properly targeted [20], how many 
incentives should be given and how large they should be 
[21]. Content can be delivered to customers that are 
interested only in incentives and are outside of the target 
market [22]. Large proportion of messages can be sent only 
because of incentives thus resulting in the lower quality of 
infections and potential of marketing action. In traditional 
approach without incentives users are motivated with 
personal factors, emotions, social reasons or altruism [7]. As 
a result content is distributed between users with higher 
social relations and with potentially better effectiveness. 
Other concerns are related to repeated messages which are 
sent to single customers. Earlier research identified that 
limited number of repetitions can positively affect purchase 
intentions but above the saturation point which is reached 
very quickly a drop in effectiveness will be observed [5]. 
With intensive sending of viral content typical for 
incentivised campaigns it can be treated as unsolicited 
messages and cause negative effects [23]. Our research 
addressed the effectiveness of viral actions and focused on 
effects of campaigns performed within social networks with 
and without incentives. The common limitation of earlier 
research was that it concentrated mainly on independent 
campaigns without the ability to directly compare different 
approaches [23], [8]. In this kind of analysis, it was difficult 
to predict how a campaign would perform with or without 
incentives. In this paper, the authors analysed two similar 
campaigns performed in the same conditions and 
environment with two approaches. The advantage of this 
research is that it was performed on real life data. 
Additionally, many earlier researches were performed on 
simulations and the authors emphasise the need for real data 
analysis [23]. During the research, it was possible to analyse 
participants of both campaigns and observe the effects of 
incentives on the overall campaign reach. The engagement in 
the campaigns and the characteristics of customers receiving 
and sending viral content of both types were analysed. In this 
paper, specifics of both strategies are presented, as well as 
levels of engagement in both campaigns and characteristics 
of users affecting the engagement in both campaigns. 
III. VIRAL CAMPAIGNS FOR ACTIVITY  
A. Social Platform Description 
The research was performed within the social platform 
working in a form of virtual world available in Poland. The 
system connects functions of chat and entertainment 
platform, in which users are represented by graphical avatars, 
and they have the opportunity to engage in the life of the 
online community. The key features are related to avatars 
and decorative elements, styles, clothes and virtual products. 
During the two week period of the campaigns, it was 
analysed that 16695 users logged in to the system and 5112 
(30.67%) of them engaged in at least one of the two viral 
campaigns as a receiver or a sender. Based on the 
demographic of the users who were engaged within this time 
it was found that 3697 were females (70.36%) and 1515 
were males (29.64%). The attributes of the users used in this 
research are related to measuring the overall user activity 
represented by Experience factor (avg=146.72), total number 
of logins to the system represented by Logins variable 
(avg=254.37), number of private messages sent and received 
within the internal communication system denoted 
respectively as Msgout (avg=493.38) and Msgin (avg=536.99), 
number of friends with distinguished inbound connections 
Friendsin (avg=215.42) and outbound connections Friendsout 
(avg=144.99). Users are connected with social relation based 
on connections and friends lists. The main metrics of social 
network connecting participants of the campaign are 
represented in Table I. 
TABLE I.  NETWORK METRICS  
 Network metrics  Value  
Nodes 5,112 
Edges 158,443 
Average node degree 74.33 
Network diameter 6 
Average length of shortest paths 2.462 
Social connections between users are weighted with 
parameters related to communication activity and messages 
sent between users with attributes Msgab and Msgba. Apart 
from the global activity where the distinguished parameters 
representing short term activities within 30 days before the 
campaign were denoted for messages as Msgout,30 
(avg=43.15) and received Msgin,30 (avg=43.44), Friendsin,30 
(avg=14.77) and Friendsout,30(avg=13.58). An additional 
attribute Payments (avg=2.05) is related to the number of 
transactions and purchased premium services that was used. 
This attribute is important from the marketing point of view 
and it is related to the analysis of ARPU (average revenue 
per user) and ARPPU (average revenue per paying user) as 
the main parameter of business model evaluation. Other 
financial factors were based on virtual cash at the user 
account and was denoted as Vcash (avg=212.22). Virtual 
cash can be received from other users, can be won playing 
games, or added in a form of bonus after purchasing 
premium services. Social networking platform and virtual 
world engine with message systems makes it possible to 
launch viral campaigns. Viral messaging is a common way 
of distributing digital objects like gifts or avatars. The target 
group of internal viral campaigns related to new virtual 
products or avatars mainly includes users interested in 
purchasing premium services. In this paper, the viral action 
was performed during a special event connected with the 
introduction of two new avatars and two campaigns were 
conducted in the same period of time. The main aim of this 
  
research was to analyse how viral content can spread within 
the network with different strategies based on non-
incentivised and incentivised approach. 
B. Incentivised Campaign A 
Incentivized campaign denoted as A was based on a new 
avatar related to event. The only way of getting it was by 
receiving it from other users. After receiving the avatar, the 
user had ability to send it to friends.Users were motivated to 
send avatars because of competition with prizes for users 
who distribute maximal number of avatars and prizes for 
randomly selected participants. The campaign started with 
ten randomly selected seeds among logged users. The dataset 
covered 13 days of objects diffusion within the network but 
the incentivised part of the campaign ended after ten hours. 
This kind of execution delivered interesting dataset showing 
how the campaign was performing during the incentivised 
period and the inertia effect after it. During the first day 1733 
users received the avatar and 354 of them (20.43%) decided 
to redirect it to friends. The 13 day statistics showed that 
3874 users infected and 1873 of them (48.35%) decided to 
transmit the content to friends. Statistics of the viral 
connections and messages redirections show the average 
node degree 1.931, network diameter 16 and average path 
length 6.258. 
C. Non-incentivised Campaign B 
Non-incentivised campaign B was based on other avatar 
similar in functionality and style to incentivised one to avoid 
effects related to design preferences. Transmission to other 
users was possible in the same way like in campaign A. The 
viral action was started with randomly selected ten seeds. 
Users were not receiving any incentives for distribution and 
all infections were related to natural interest of products. 
During the campaign, it was observed that there was a push 
activity when users were recommending avatar and sending 
to friends and a pull activity from users seeing others 
wearing new avatar and asking them to send the new 
product. However, both types of infections were not 
distinguished and all infections were treated in a same way. 
Activity within the first day of action shows 1038 infections 
and 506 (48.75%) of infected users decided to transmit the 
object to at least one friend. During the whole period of 13 
days 3069 users received new object and 1899 of them 
(61.88%) decided to transmit content to friends. Using 
campaign data the infections network was built based on 
users engaged in non-incentive action. The statistics that was 
obtained show the main network characteristics like average 
node degree 1.863, network diameter 23 and average path 
length 6.802. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Campaign Effects Comparison 
Both campaigns were analysed within a period of thirteen 
days. For every campaign there were two types of infections 
analysed – unique and non-unique. Unique infection means 
that a user received the viral message for the first time, non-
unique means receiving multiple messages for the same user. 
Why is it worth to distinguish and compare both infection 
types? From the users’ point of view he would like to receive 
the same message only once, because while receiving 
multiple invitations to perform some activity, after reaching 
his patience threshold, he may threat this campaign as a 
spam which should generally not happen, because he may 
get a negative attitude towards the campaign. 
Statistics of both types of campaigns were presented in 
Table II. 
TABLE II.  BASIC STATISTICS OF VIRAL CAMPAIGNS 
Property 
Incentivized 
campaign A 
Non-incentivised 
campaign B 
Number of viral messages sent 28,446 9,972 
Number of unique senders 2,886 2,683 
Number of unique recipients 3,889 3,074 
Avg no. of viral msg sent per sender 9.86 3.72 
Avg no. of viral msg receiverd per 
recipient 
7.31 3.24 
Avg no. of internal messages 
exchanged between sender and 
recipient in unique transm. 
0.461 0.948 
Avg no. of internal messages 
exchanged between sender and 
recipient in non-unique transm. 
1.152 2.027 
Percentace of common senders in 
both campaigns 
34.3% 
Percentace of common receipients in 
both campaigns 
28.5% 
For every campaign, we counted the unique and non-
unique transmissions during the analysed period grouped in 
one-hour periods. They are illustrated in Figure 1 (a-d). 
At this point, it may be observed that despite the huge 
amount of viral messages sent in incentivised campaign 
(almost three times bigger volume of messages), results of 
information spreading are almost similar – only a 26% 
increase in the number of unique recipients who received the 
viral message. All the others (74%) received the message 
multiple times, despite the fact that they knew it already. The 
huge peak in Figures 1(a-b) for incentivised campaign is due 
to the limited time the avatar transmission was offered, as 
described in Section IV. 
  
 
Figure 1.  Results of incentivised campaign compared to non-incentivised one
What may be also interesting is the ratio of unique to 
non-unique messages sent which is presented in Figure 2. 
 
It clearly points out that the effectiveness of incentivised 
campaign is rather small in comparison to the second one. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Ratio of unique to non-unique messages in both campaigns 
  
B. Inertia of the Incentivised Campaign 
When analysing the incentivised campaign, it could be 
seen that the transmission of avatars did not finish after ten 
hours, but it was still transmitted after the end of the contest. 
During the contest, 20,917 messages were sent, while 7,529 
were sent later and the ratio of users sending the avatars 
during the contest to those sending after was 1:4. More 
information about this situation is presented in Table III. 
TABLE III.  INCENTIVISED CAMPAIGN  
DURING AND AFTER THE CONTEST 
Property 
During  
the contest 
After 
the contest 
Number of viral messages sent 20,917 7,529 
No. of senders sending avatars only in one 
period 
506 2050 
No. of senders sending avatars during both 
periods 
330 
Avg number of viral cash per sender 453.8 199.3 
Avg user experience (specific for this portal) 296.3 153.1 
It may be observed that different groups were involved in 
sending the viral content during the contest and after it. Less 
number of users generated huge volume of messages, so they 
were more focused on winning the contest, but later less than 
a half of them were interested in sending the viral content 
further. After going in deeper detail, the difference between 
some crucial user attributes is also observable – more 
experienced users were interested only in the contest, which 
proves that the rest sending the avatar later may not even 
know the precise rules of the contest, but they simply 
forwarded the received message without reflecting or 
checking whether they will benefit from it. This situation 
was called by the authors’ inertia of the incentivised 
campaign – when the viral action still takes place and the 
consequences of it monitored as well. So it is important to 
observe what is happening after the initial period due to the 
fact that some trouble may arise during the campaign. For 
example, if users notice that they were performing some 
action without the chance of getting rewarded (because they 
were not aware of the rules) they may think negatively about 
the campaign. Therefore, whether the campaign should 
continue after the competition has ended should be taken into 
account.  
C. Factors Affecting Receiving Viral Content 
For both senders and recipients of viral messages 
multiple regression models were built with the number of 
viruses received and sent as dependent variables and set of 
parameters collected from the system as independent 
variables. The dataset includes 5112 users participating in 
the campaign and among them 1448 participating in a 
passive way (only receiving viral content) and 3664 in an 
active way (distributing content). In the first stage of the 
study, the variables that influence the number of infections 
obtained for both types of virus were identified. The results 
indicate that, to obtain a virus the greatest importance was 
related to the parameters associated with the number of 
incoming contacts in the social network Friendsin, 30 (b = 
0.117716, p = 0.000912) and the activity in the frequency of 
system usage in the period preceding the campaign 
Logins30(b=0.102417, p= 0.000054). The number of received 
viruses was affected by the Experience variable 
(b=0.095032, p=0.010929) and by the number of 
transactions made in advance represented by Payments 
(b=0.048614, p=0.014776). The analysis performed for the 
virus B shows a larger share of social and communication 
factors among variables affecting the results. The biggest 
impact on the number of infections was identified on 
received messages Msgin (b=0.293555, p= 0.000000), Msgin, 
30 (b=0.194994, p = 0.001758), incoming social connections 
Friendsin,30 (b=0,196077, p=0.000000) and Experience 
(b=0.192970, p=0.000000). The negative impact on the 
number of B infections received and messages sent both on a 
global basis Msgout (b=-0.145451, p= 0.002394) and in the 
period preceding the campaign Msgout, 30 (b=-0.139078, p=0, 
009 522). This result may indicate that users initiating 
communications show greater activity when sending 
messages; in group of lower social status with fewer friends; 
and when the viral message is addressed to them with less 
intensity than for users who have a higher position and 
receive more messages. When Friendsin,30, Msgin and Msgin, 
30 was increased it was observed that it had a positive effect 
on the number of infections. This indicates a greater share of 
the infected hosts in the campaign of B. In summary, for the 
B virus a greater impact on the number of infections had 
social factors. Virus B was distributed between the users 
who are more likely to send messages and have more friends. 
Campaign B had more in common with real 
recommendations because of the bond that existed between 
the sender and recipient. 
D. Factors Affecting Non-unique Sending 
In the next step, the authors analysed factors affecting the 
total number of sent viruses of both types using all messages 
including multiple but not unique infections. In the campaign 
A, the greatest impact on the number of infection sent had 
the user experience Experience (b=0.213924, p=0.000000) 
and frequency of service usage during the preceding 
campaign period Logins30 (b=0.173429, p=0.000000). The 
number of infections was positively affected by the number 
of incoming social connections Friendsin (b=0.126089, 
p=0.001040), Friendsin,30 (b=0.072358, p=0.039134). The 
interest in the action was influenced by the number of units 
of virtual currency Vcash (b=0.070385, p=0.000016) 
gathered at a user account which indicates the interest of 
collecting virtual currency and importance to this form of 
activity on the site for this group of users. The negative 
influence of the number of transactions represented by a 
Payments variable (b=-0.075488, p=0.000130) was also 
highlighted. This indicates less involvement in the 
distribution of virus “A” users who were making payments 
and small prizes were not enough to motivate them to join 
the campaign and to send infections. The results indicate that 
the target group paying for services was less likely to 
participate in activities related to the incentives. The negative 
effect was shown for incoming Msgin,30 (b=-0.148785, 
  
p=0.000130), and social connections outgoing Friendsout 
(b=-0.043822,p=0.029471). For the number of B infections 
sent, the biggest impact was communication activity 
associated with sending messages Msgout (b=0.266384, 
p=0.000001) and incoming connections in the structures of 
social networks in both the shorter horizon Friendsin,30 
(b=0.122330, p=0.000000) and from the beginning of an 
account creation Friendsin (b=0.122330, p=0.001597). In the 
distribution of media B negative effect of Payments and 
Vcash on the user account was not identified. This indicates 
a greater potential for this type of campaign by reaching the 
users from the target group than with campaign B. 
E. Factors Affecting Unique Sending 
In the next step, the authors analysed factors affecting 
engagement in sending unique viruses. The results are 
presented in the Table IV. For sending virus and unique 
infections the greatest impact was related to communication 
activity and messages in a short time horizon Msgout,30 (b= 
0.240524, p=0.000023) and Experience (b=0.231068, p= 
0.000000). 
TABLE IV.  FACTORS AFFECTING UNIQUE SENDING 
Attribute Campaign A Campaign B 
  b* p-value b* p-value 
Experience 0.231068 0.000000 0.105718 0.000216 
Logins 0.007407 0.843140 0.008628 0.818711 
Msgin 0.152520 0.007948 -0.410444 0.000000 
Msgout -0.124639 0.010946 0.349491 0.000000 
Friendsin 0.037784 0.391880 0.248219 0.000000 
Friendsout -0.059063 0.006637 -0.132900 0.000000 
Payments -0.025618 0.188812 -0.041022 0.036418 
Logins30 0.047280 0.086710 -0.002336 0.932909 
Msgin,30 -0.224222 0.000955 0.022338 0.743298 
Msgout,30 0.240524 0.000023 -0.007669 0.893056 
Friendsin,30 0.049898 0.197303 0.051534 0.185454 
Friendsout,30 -0.022194 0.360718 0.084583 0.000537 
Vcash 0.012923 0.416345 0.015013 0.347756 
Age -0.017185 0.246322 0.019520 0.190367 
The lower level of influence was related to the number of 
received messages Msgin (b=0.152520, p=0.007948). But in a 
short-time horizon, the messages Msgin,30 (b=-0.224222, 
p=0.000955) received and sent in the long term Msgout (b=-
0.124639, p=0.010946) were affecting results negatively. 
The negative impact was identified for social network out 
coming connections Friendsout(b=-0.059063, p=-0.059063). 
For the virus B and unique infection the greatest impact was 
related to communication activity in the longer term view 
Msgout(b=0.349491, p=0.000000), the number of incoming 
connections in the social network Friendsin (b=0.248219, 
p=0.000000). Less important was the Experience 
(b=0.105718, p=0.000216) and outgoing calls in a short-time 
horizon Friendsout, 30 (b=0.084583, p=0.000537). Infections 
were negatively affected by the number of unique messages 
received Msgin (b=-0.410444, p= 0.000000) and out coming 
social connections in the longer-time horizon Friendsout(b =-
0.132900, p = 0.000000). 
F. Users’ Groups Analysis 
During the campaign analysis, the eight groups of users 
with different levels of involvement in the action of A and B 
were distinguished. Table V shows the quantitative 
characteristics for each group and their participation in the 
campaigns. The number of received infections (Rcv A, Rcv 
B), total sent viruses (Sent A, Sent B), and unique infections 
(sent UA, UB sent) is specified. The differences between the 
groups were compared using the U Mann-Whitney test. The 
analysis of the members of the groups G1 and G2 shows the 
important differences with respect to the activity and 
frequency of use with the variable representing the greatest 
difference in frequency of use Logins Z = 9.84812, p = 
0.000000), with an average ranking in the test Avgrank (G1) 
= 1011, 8 and Avgrank (G2) = 719.0 in favour of G1. The 
big difference between users was identified for the group 
which was designated for incoming calls in a social network 
Friendsin (Z=9.38871, p=0.000000). Larger differences 
existed in the analysis of variables associated with the 
activity in the longer term than in short term. A negative 
correlation was identified only for age, indicating a greater 
involvement in the action of members of the lower age 
group. When comparing the groups G3 and G4, no 
differences were observed at an acceptable level of 
significance apart from Payments with slight difference of 
the G3 (Z=2.296994, p=0.021620) and the amount of virtual 
currency associated with the user account (Z=1.889236, 
p=0.058861). 
TABLE V.  GROUP ANALYSIS 
Group Description Users Rcv A Rcv B Sent A Sent B Sent UA Sent UB 
G1  
G2  
G3  
G4  
G5  
G6  
G7  
G8 
Received A & Band sent A & B 
Received A & B 
Received A & Band sent A  
Received A & Band sent B 
Received A and sent A 
Received B and sent B 
Received A 
Received B 
 1450  
437  
236  
 238 
521 
314  
 713 
298  
16236 
3358 
2376 
1737 
2167 
- 
2083 
- 
6551 
1106 
737 
742 
- 
419 
- 
353 
25425 
- 
1130 
- 
890 
- 
- 
- 
7933 
- 
- 
526 
- 
440 
- 
- 
2823 
- 
159 
- 
494 
- 
- 
- 
2206 
- 
- 
188 
- 
305 
- 
- 
 
In the next step, the author examined the members of 
groups G5 and G7. The biggest differences between the 
groups at a significance level of p <0.05 occur when the 
Experience was (Z=5.409985, p=0.000001), the activity of 
communication for both Msgin was (Z=4.988272, 
p=0.000001), Msgout was (Z=4.918889, p=0.000001), 
networking in a social network and network Friendsin was 
(Z=4.97137, p=0.000001) and Friendsout was (Z=4.50486, 
p=0.000001). For the group G3 there was also more activity 
regarding Payments (Z=4.688503, p=0.000003). The G5 
  
group, therefore, depended on length of service usage and 
long-term activity. An increase in the age limit decreased the 
activity in the distribution of virus A as well as the interest in 
the incentives. The analysis of the groups G6 and G8 
indicates that these groups differ on the significance level of 
p <0.05 values of the attributes associated with Payments 
(Z=2.078155, p=0.037695) and the amount of virtual 
currency possessed Vcash (Z=2.125952, p=0.033507). For 
both variables, higher values were obtained in the group G6 
with engagement in virus B distribution. This indicates a 
greater interest in new product and distributing it further with 
users who are making payments and are interested in new 
services. For groups G1 and G3 the major differences 
between groups at a low level (Z=2.493669, p=0.012643) for 
Friendsin occur in the light of incoming connections to lists 
of friends within the social network, number of Logins 
(Z=2.153197, p=0.031303), Msgin (Z=2.231340, 
p=0.025659) and Msgout (Z=2.354610, p=0.018542). 
Members who distributed only one content were less 
engaged in community activities and communication. 
Another situation is for groups G1 and G4. The biggest 
difference was observed between the G1 and G4, with the 
number of payments Payments (Z=4.636971, p = 0.000004). 
G1 and G3 was also largely influenced by the number of 
links in social network Friendsin (Z=4.197551, p=0.000004). 
A bigger difference was observed between G1 vs. G4 than 
between G1 vs. G3. 
G. Classification of Users 
To confirm whether it is possible to predict users’ 
affiliation to a particular group defined in previous 
subsection (G1-G8), the authors decided to setup an 
experiment in Weka classification environment [24]. A set of 
features were used and the general properties of the social 
network users were: general portal experience, number of 
logins, number of messages sent and received, number of 
friends, age, gender, and amount of virtual cash. The 
following algorithms were evaluated and used for the 
classification: naive Bayes [25], J48 decision tree [26], 
decision stump [27], SMO [28], multilayer perceptron [29], 
and SVM [30]. The 10-fold cross-validation method was the 
validation method that was used [31]. Initially, the 
classification results were unacceptable, because the average 
accuracy was about 35%. In that case, the authors decided to 
distinguish between the two classes only – G1 and all the 
others, because the involvement of a user in both campaigns 
proves that incentives had no or limited influence on his 
decision to participate in particular campaign. Table VI 
presents results of classification for the two classes. 
TABLE VI.  CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR TWO CLASSES (G1 VS. ALL 
OTHERS) 
Classification algorithm Accuracy (%) Time (s) 
Naïve Bayes [25] 68.34 0.06 
J48 decision tree [26] 67.63 0.45 
Decision stump [27] 65.53 0.06 
Classification algorithm Accuracy (%) Time (s) 
SMO [28] 69.08 2.21 
Multilayer perceptron [29] 69.34 23.74 
SVM [30] 69.17 7.07 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Earlier research related to information diffusion, viral 
marketing, and models are based mostly on simulations 
which were criticised by several authors. In this research, the 
data sample from real campaigns was used and the 
behaviours observed were based on the social interaction in 
the real-life online environment. 
The experimental results revealed that during the 
incentivised campaign the less important success factor was 
the social position and engagement of a user in the 
community. Non-incentivised campaign engaged users and 
integrated them more with the community - messages with 
new products were sent rather to friends. What was more 
significant was the relationship between the sender and 
receiver. It was shown that incentivised campaigns are 
similar to mass media campaigns where messages are 
broadcasted to groups of untargeted users, even though this 
may not be necessarily the goal of the campaign initiators. 
This kind of less invasive activity can be located between 
real recommendations among friends and seeding performed 
by the campaign organiser. Such activity takes on a form of 
supporting initial seeding with the advantage that it is 
performed by community members and the responsibility for 
sending messages is transferred to community members. 
This way the campaign organiser is not treated as a massive 
sender. 
The percentage of users engaging in non-incentive 
campaign among all infected was higher than incentivised. It 
shows that users receiving non-incentivised content were 
more motivated to forward messages because of emotions, 
altruism and other sociological factors identified as a key for 
successful campaign. 
Incentives can result with very high commitment in 
actions confirmed in the research by a high but not unique 
infection number. Simultaneously, it negatively affects 
receivers of such messages and causes them to treat 
messages as a spam. But senders engaged in this kind of 
action can be negatively affected because incentives were 
only available to a limited number of winners or the 
incentive value was too low to attract users with relatively 
small number of infections. This way high commitment and 
efforts to collect incentives usually result in low rewards. In 
the observed campaign, after releasing results of the 
competition, many users were frustrated with the results – 
they did not win any prize even spending a lot of time on 
infecting others. This shows that incentives strategy should 
be adjusted to the audience profile and many factors should 
be taken into account during the planning of the campaign. 
  
However, in this research the authors did not have the 
opportunity to analyse how the value of incentive affects 
open campaign dynamics and range. The campaigns studied 
were performed in the closed community with no possibility 
to spread anything outside. This situation is similar to most 
social platforms which are natural environments for viral 
marketing actions and their community is the main target. 
Another case may occur for large scale campaigns operating 
without tight boundaries. Despite these limitations, the 
results of the campaigns revealed that incentives can be 
treated as an important part of the strategy but they not 
necessarily positively influence the final range of the 
campaign. Marketers should be aware that it is hard to 
predict negative effects of this type of actions, however, 
some clues about those were provided in this paper. 
When about future work directions, authors will try to 
compare experimental results and theoretical models 
proposed by others and extend them with parameters related 
to incentives and other forms of motivation. An interesting 
area is searching for effective strategies of reaching target 
groups within community and adapting strategy to social 
network characteristics and user attributes. A study on 
differentiated incentives values and their influence on user 
behaviour in the same controlled environment is planned. 
Simultaneously, there is a need to verify that similar results 
are to be found in other social platforms. 
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